Chapter 138: The Mushrooms That Can Be Taken Out

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Saudi Arabia’s words carried much deeper meaning—what other warheads could possess such immense power and penetration besides nuclear ones? At this moment, Israel possessed the Jericho missile, and as early as 1965, had built a nuclear reactor. By the 1980s, Israel’s nuclear weapons status was almost an open secret, making it a classic case of a nuclear-ambiguous state.

Israel had nuclear weapons, while the Arab world did not—could such an imbalance maintain a delicate equilibrium? Clearly not. Western countries covertly supported Israel, yet simultaneously kept it in check.

The U.S. intervention to compel Israel to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt was a prime example: supporting Israel to maintain balance, while restraining it to preserve that same balance.

The actions of the U.S. and the West were transparent to all nations, especially the Arab states, who, upon analysis, realized they needed to find a way. Saudi Arabia must have its own countermeasures to stand against Israel.

What could counter nuclear weapons? Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons themselves. Thus, what Saudi Arabia referred to as warheads more powerful than conventional ones naturally meant nuclear warheads.

When Saudi Arabia made such a statement, Commander Nie naturally pondered its deeper implication. Yang Hui understood the meaning but had developed a new idea.

Saudi Arabia’s desire for nuclear warheads would ultimately succeed. The Republic would surely provide a nuclear umbrella, and these warheads would be jointly managed. Yet this would never be openly admitted; outwardly, only conventional warheads would be mentioned, since openly discussing nuclear warheads would not inspire confidence.

Therefore, a warhead more powerful than conventional ones but less sensitive than nuclear warheads could be developed—a semi-publicly known, fully controlled sub-nuclear weapon. This would be far more reassuring and reliable than jointly managed nuclear warheads and would serve as an additional safeguard.

This necessitated something like the napalm bomb, a devastating weapon. Yang Hui feigned ignorance of Saudi Arabia’s deeper meaning and spoke literally:

“Your Highness, to have a warhead more powerful than conventional ones, you need something like a napalm bomb. Its effectiveness was proven during the U.S. Vietnam War, earning it the title of a sub-nuclear weapon.”

Indeed, the napalm bomb’s ferocity was comparable to nuclear weapons, differing mainly in radiation effects. Yet its power was roughly equivalent to those two bombs dropped in World War II.

Its destructive capacity was more than sufficient—far stronger than conventional warheads. Such a sub-nuclear weapon would be enough.

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Commander Nie was also intrigued by Yang Hui’s proposal. When Saudi Arabia first mentioned more powerful warheads, Nie had already deduced their ultimate goal.

In fact, on the night of the meeting in the South China Sea, initial guesses had been made, though nothing certain. Now, with confirmation, all was clear. According to the plan agreed upon by the major powers, the Republic had always intended to provide Saudi Arabia with a protective umbrella. They had even discussed a final measure: transporting nuclear warheads to Saudi Arabia and having Republic personnel manage them.

However, these plans were unreliable and risky. Leaving nuclear warheads in Saudi Arabia was unsafe. But providing sub-nuclear weapons posed no such problem, allowing full control of the warheads by Saudi Arabia—a mutually favorable arrangement.

With this new solution, they awaited Saudi Arabia’s response.

“I think Yang Hui’s plan is quite good. I wonder what Your Highness thinks. Of course, the fundamental reason we sell missiles remains unchanged.”

Sultan understood Commander Nie’s words, glanced at the unrelated staff nearby, and hesitated to speak.

Yang Hui stood up first and walked outside. The others understood immediately, following him resolutely, leaving only Sultan and Nie inside to discuss matters of mutual concern.

“Equipping us with napalm bombs means you won’t provide us with nuclear warheads, correct?”

A succinct question, clearly stated. Nie did not withhold the truth.

“This nuclear warhead issue is simple. If you don’t want napalm bombs, we will provide nuclear warheads, but we will send personnel to manage them. If you want napalm bombs, we will hand over the warheads directly to you without interference. The choice is yours.”

A difficult decision indeed. Was the napalm bomb good? Absolutely. During the Vietnam War, Americans frequently dropped napalm bombs, and their ferocity rivaled that of fission nuclear bombs.

Now, outfitting these on the Type-3 missiles would create solid sub-nuclear missile weapons, fully controlled by Saudi Arabia.

Choosing this sub-nuclear option, however, meant real nuclear weapons could not be deployed in Saudi Arabia—a true case of gain and loss. Sultan hesitated; Nie did not rush him, allowing reflection.

Ultimately, the desire for independence prevailed. Better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of a phoenix—preferring fully controlled sub-nuclear weapons over partially controlled nuclear weapons.

Still, Sultan harbored other thoughts: “If we choose napalm bombs, nuclear weapons cannot be deployed in Saudi Arabia. But can the Republic, in the event of a major threat, transport nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia? Or publicly declare a nuclear protection guarantee?”

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Nuclear protection was a responsibility the Republic had long accepted. Since it had received payment, disaster relief was obligatory.

“That is no problem. Once our order is fulfilled and missiles delivered to Saudi Arabia, it is almost settled. When you face danger, you can test-fire a missile—a sub-nuclear weapon with deterrence comparable to nuclear arms. Seeing the Type-3 missile, many countries dare not act rashly. At that time, we will issue a statement affirming our protection.”

As long as nuclear warheads were not shipped to Saudi Arabia, issuing a statement was a minor matter. Providing protection was a duty.

With the Republic’s nuclear umbrella and Saudi Arabia’s own sub-nuclear weapons, this was the best combination.

“That’s good. Then we will definitely choose napalm bombs; it should be the best option.”

After reviewing the $4 billion budget, it was clear that developing napalm bombs meant no need to develop conventional warheads, saving $200 million. Yet developing and producing dozens of napalm bombs would still cost money.

“How much will it cost to purchase napalm warheads? We plan to buy thirty missiles, so thirty warheads. Our project funds are limited, so please don’t make it too expensive.”

It was the first time Saudi Arabia mentioned tight finances. Although this referred only to the originally approved funds, the performance achieved already exceeded expectations. Sultan was pleased but wanted to keep costs under control.

Nie also agreed this was sufficient for now. The cooperation was long-term, and the Republic’s reputation must not suffer.

“Alright, let’s say $10 million per napalm bomb, including development costs—that’s $300 million total, which isn’t too expensive.”

Three hundred million dollars was acceptable. Sultan calculated the total to be $3.45 billion. Seeing the expenditure was straightforward, and considering future missile base construction and other projects, an idea struck him: why not entrust everything to the Republic?

“Total $3.45 billion. We’ll add another $50 million to round it to $3.5 billion and entrust you with the selection and construction of missile bases as well.”

That was more like it. With rough terms agreed, Nie breathed a long sigh of relief. The project was mostly settled, now awaiting detailed discussions with Saudi Arabia. (To be continued.)